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Abstract 
Bundling Information Goods: The Case of E-Journals  
Tan Yong 
With the development of the Internet, e-business has become popular. Increasingly, e-
journals are being sold via the Internet. E-Journals have two main characteristics: one is 
the low marginal cost associated with access; the other is the large number of items. For 
the commercially motivated seller, the issue of bundling a large number of low marginal 
cost items so as to maximize profits needs to be dealt with. In this thesis, a solution by 
way of an intermediate bundle is proposed. It is found that the profit obtained under the 
proposed procedure is 4% to 5% higher than that under the Chuang-Sirbu procedure, 
which is currently adopted by many sellers. Furthermore, when the number of products 
involved is not extremely large, the proposed procedure yields a profit level that is closer 
to the first price discrimination profit level than the Armstrong two-part tariff procedure. 
In this thesis, a heuristic rule to facilitate the determination of the optimal intermediate 
bundle size is also proposed. This is designed to avoid the lengthy simulation procedure 
that will be needed otherwise. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Product bundling refers to the business practice whereby a seller sells two or more 
heterogeneous products or services in a bundle while charging a single price. Practical 
examples of bundling include Microsoft Office, which contains a set of stand-alone 
products such as MS-Word, Powerpoint, and Excel; Yahoo! Music, to which a consumer 
may listen to any item of music tracks within a month by subscribing for a fee of $4.99; 
and, in the more traditional setting, Pepboys Auto’s Maintenance service, in which an 
automobile owner can have both oil change and tire rotation done at a single discount 
price. 
  The bundling literature offers three major reasons for a seller to bundle products. 
First, there is cost saving argument. For instance, it has been noted in Nalebuff (2004), 
that “(i)n a larger sense, almost everything is a bundle product. A car is a bundle of seats, 
engine, steering wheel, gas pedal, cup holders, and much more. An obvious explanation 
for many bundles is that the company can integrate the products better than its customers 
can.” 
  In addition to reducing the integration cost, bundling may also reduce transaction 
and distribution costs involved in the selling process whenever seller-side bundling 
simplifies the shopping and shipping processes [See, for instance, Salinger (1995), Bakos 
and Brynjolfsson (2000)]. Whenever cost-saving via bundling is feasible, the bundle in 
question has an intrinsic cost-advantage over its individual items, thus the practice of 
bundling here may result in the seller enjoys a higher margin. 
  Though often mentioned in the literature, the cost-saving argument received little 
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attention in theoretical expositions due to its straightforwardness. Instead, the theoretical 
literature has focused attention on those cases where bundling itself does not offer any 
cost advantage. In particular, the focus has been on the use of bundling as a tool for price 
discrimination and as a tool in competition, the former typically addressed under a 
monopoly setting while the later in a duopoly setting. 
  Earlier research on the use of bundling for price discrimination argues that 
bundling reduces heterogeneity in buyers’ valuations which in turn enables a monopolist 
to better capture the consumer surplus when marginal production cost is not high [See, 
for instance, Stigler (1963), Adams and Yellen (1976)]. This logic is well illustrated in 
instances where buyers’ valuations over two products are negatively correlated. 
  While earlier studies on bundling two products are more concerned with when the 
monopolist should bundle, a number of recent papers shift the focus to how to bundle—
namely, what bundling strategy should a seller adopt (unbundling, pure bundling, or 
mixed bundling), and the structure of prices the seller should choose under each of these 
strategies. When dealing with business practices on the e-platform, owing to the large 
number of items involved in the typical situation, it has all the more become necessary to 
deal with this problem of how to bundle. Many papers have attempted to shed light on 
this issue. These include Hanson and Martin (1990), Armstrong (1999), Bakos and 
Brynjolfsson (1999) and Chang and Sirbu (1999) and different strategies have been 
proposed. This thesis adds to the literature by proposing a different albeit simple bundling 
strategy through which a seller may be able to enhance its business performance. In 
particular, a three-bundle strategy is proposed. 
In terms of exposition, the thesis is organized as follow. In the main, Chapter 2 
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discusses to some detail the papers just mentioned. While the emphasis here is on 
bundling as a tool for price discrimination, a brief outline of bundling as a competitive 
tool is also provided. Chapter 3 outlines the basic Chuang-Sirbu model and the extension 
that this thesis proposes. In Chapter 4, in addition to reporting the main results of the 
study, a comparison of the business performance of the proposed strategy and other 
existing procedures is also carried out. Chapter 5 concludes with further research 
directions. 
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Chapter 2 
Review of Selected Literature 
 
In this review, the main focus is on bundling as a tool for price discrimination. The 
emphasis here is especially on those papers that relate to the bundling of a large number 
of products. This survey also briefly covers bundling as a tool for competition. 
First of all, as mentioned, there are three strategies frequently cited and compared in 
the literature: pure unbundling, pure bundling; and mixed bundling. Pure unbundling 
refers to the business practice of selling all goods or items separately in the market; pure 
bundling, on the other hand, refers to the selling of all goods/items in a single package; 
and mixed bundling refers to the business practice of doing both, that is, offering 
customers the opportunity to purchase single items as well as the opportunity to purchase 
the entire bundled package. This obviously refers to the two-product case. If there are 
more than two products, the situation will obviously be more complicated. Potentially, 
mixed bundling in this other instance could involve 2N-1 bundles altogether. 
2.1 Bundling as a Tool for Competition 
When rivals exist, the reason for a seller to bundle products is often to use bundling as a 
competition tool. Indeed, this role of bundling is widely publicized in both business and 
in academic community following the trials on U.S. vs. Microsoft, where Microsoft is 
alleged to have use its monopoly power (and later judged so in several cases) in personal 
computer (PC) operating systems to unfairly compete with rivals in other software 
markets, such as the web browser market. 
There are two major research strands on using bundling as a competition tool. The 
 4
first strand relates to what is termed as “leverage theory” and is typically discussed in a 
setting involving two products and two ex ante asymmetric sellers: one seller has 
monopoly power over one product and competes with the other seller in the second 
product market. The research is on whether the first seller can leverage its monopoly 
power in the first product market to gain competitive advantage over (or even foreclose) 
its rival in the second product market. In this strand of research, the term “tying” is 
frequently used in place of “bundling”. 
Ward S. Bowman, Jr (1957) and Burstein (1960) examine both litigated and non-
litigated industrial examples and conclude that leveraging is an implausible explanation 
for most of them. Even in those cases where leverage is not implausible, they conclude 
that price discrimination is a more plausible explanation. 
In recent years there has been a dramatic shift in opinion as to whether leveraging is 
effective for the first seller. Beginning with the seminal paper by Whinston (1990), 
however, there has been a series of papers that shifted the setting of the second product 
market from a competitive one to a duopoly one. As pointed out by Whinston, “… tying 
may be an effective (and profitable) means for a monopolist to affect the market structure 
of the tied good market by making continued operation unprofitable for tied product 
rivals”. Whinston points out that the reason why in the previous papers, those authors 
think there is no leverage effect of tying is because of an implicit assumption: there is a 
monopoly market plus a competitive market. He says: “with this assumption, the use of 
leverage to affect the market structure of the tied good market is actually impossible.” 
But, in contrast to the previous paper, if the assumption is changed to one involving a 
monopoly market and a duopoly market, tying sales can affect the market structure. 
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The second major research strand on using bundling as a competition tool considers 
two ex ante symmetric sellers [See, for instance, Matutes and Regibeau (1992), Chen 
(1997)]. Having one seller beating the other one is not the research focus. Instead, this 
strand focuses on two questions. First, will sellers adopt bundling in equilibrium? So far 
the results are mixed. Second, can the option of bundling (compared to unbundled selling 
only) increase profits of both sellers? In an insightful paper, Chen (1997) gives an 
affirmative answer—he shows that bundling can be an effective price differentiation 
mechanism, which helps to avoid price wars.   
We now leave this brief review of the use of bundling as a tool for competition to 
focus attention on the aspect of bundling that is directly related to the thesis research, 
namely, the use of bundling as a tool for price discrimination. 
2.2 Bundling as a Tool for Price Discrimination 
This is another reason for a seller to engage in product bundling, even if there is no 
leverage effect or competitive advantage from a bundling strategy, a seller may still use 
bundling to enhance its profits. This is a form of price discrimination, which is distinct 
from traditional price discrimination. The ensuing elaborates on this idea. 
2.2.1 The Two-Product Case  
Stigler (1963) is one of the earliest professors who suggest the bundling problem in 
reality.  He observed that the phenomenon of block-booking of movie—the offer of only 
a combined assortment of movies to an exhibitor—has been the subject of several 
antitrust cases at that time. And, he finds the explanation of the practice of block-booking 
is not because of leveraging market power, just a way to increase profit. Further more, he 
points that, negative correlation in reserve price can make bundling be a better than 
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unbundling for seller.     
Based on Stigler’s work, Adams and Yellen (1976) consider a monopolist producing 
two goods with constant unit cost and facing buyers with diverse tastes. Further more, 
they assume the marginal utility of a second unit of either good to be zero for all buyers. 
Under these setups they find the conditions under which pure bundling is more profitable 
than unbundling are: (a) consumers’ reserve prices for the two goods should be 
negatively correlated; and (b) the marginal cost of the goods should not be too high. 
However, researchers soon discover that, for a monopolist, negatively correlation in 
reserve prices is not a necessary condition for bundling to be profitable. Schmalensee 
(1984) opts for a special form of joint valuation distribution—the bivariate normal 
distribution, that is analytically less daunting (yet numerical analysis is still needed to 
find results even in the case). The basic model adopt by Schmalensee (1984) is as follows. 
Let be a symmetric bivariate normal distribution with mean1 2( , )F v v μ , standard 
deviationσ , and correlation coefficient ρ . Where is consumer’s reserve price to the 
product 1 and product 2 separately, here assume follows same distribution, so E( ) 
= E( ) =
1 2,v v
1 2,v v 1v
2v μ and 1 2var( ) var( )v v σ= = . Then he calculates the maximized profit under the 
three different strategies—pure unbundling, pure bundling, and mixed bundling. Next 
step, he compares the maximized profit under different strategies to find the optimal 
strategy. And his conclusion is that: pure bundling can be better than unbundling for the 
seller even if the valuations of both goods are positively (yet not perfect) correlated. The 
reason is that, pure bundling can reduce the heterogeneity of the reserve price.  
Complementary and substitutive goods are considered by many researchers, they try 
to find out which strategy is optimal under the situation of bundling complementary and 
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substitutive products respectively. To answer the question, Venkatesh and Kamakura 
(2003) develop an analytical model of contingent valuations and address two questions of 
import to a monopolist: (1) should a given pair of complements or substitutes be sold 
separately (pure components), together (pure bundling), or both (mixed bundling), and at 
what prices? (2) How do optimal bundling and pricing strategies for complements and 
substitutes differ from those for independently valued products? In Venkatesh and 
Kamakura’s model they only consider two goods, and they useθ to denote a consumer’s 
degree of complementarity or substitutability.θ = (Reservation price for bundle 12-sum 
of stand-alone reservation prices for product 1 and 2).  
 12 1 2(1 )( )v v vθ= + +  
Where v1 and v2 are the reserve price for separate good 1 and good 2; and v12 is the 
reserve price for the bundle includes good 1 and good 2 in it.  For complementary goods 
1 and 2,θ should be positive, and for substitutive goodsθ should be negative. Then he use 
the same way with Schmalensee: calculates the maximized profit under the three 
strategies, then they compare them to find which strategy is the optimal strategy with the 
changing ofθ . 
2.2.2 The N-Product Case 
While earlier studies on bundling two products are more concerned with when to bundle, 
a number of recent papers have shifted focus to how to bundle—namely, what bundling 
strategy a seller should pick (unbundling, pure bundling, or mixed bundling), and what 
price the seller should choose for each sub-bundle or individual product. Answering these 
questions requires the researcher to deal with more than two products, which is the norm, 
rather than the exception, in practice. The literature takes two routes in dealing with the 
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“how” question. One strand of research tries to provide numerical solutions to optimal 
mixed-bundling prices using integer programming approaches [See, for instance, Hanson 
and Martin (1990), Armstrong (1999), Hitt and Chen (2005)]. Computational complexity 
is a major challenge to this strand of research. The other strand focuses on getting 
analytical results for pure bundling or very simple forms of mixed bundling [See, for 
instance, Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999), (2000a, 2000b)]. One important result for this 
strand of research is that bundling can be surprisingly profitable and at the same time 
extremely simple. 
 
Integer Programming (IP) and Customized Bundling 
For the first strand of research a la Hanson and Martin (1990), the details are as follows. 
Let N be a finite number and let there be at most M buyer types, M finite. Let jβ denote 
the percentage of type j buyers in the whole buyer population, where . Any type j 
buyer has a constant valuation vector (
j M∈
1 2, ,......j jv v vNj ), where is the reserve price of 
consumer j to product . Let B be the set of all possible sub-bundles under mixed 
bundling. The size of B is 2
ijv
i
N-1. A type j buyer’s valuation of sub-bundle 
b∈ B is . The marginal cost for the seller to provide sub-bundle bbj
i b
v
∈
= ∑ j iv ∈ B  is 
, where is the marginal cost for product i. Let b i
i b
c
∈
=∑c ic 1bjx = if a buyer of type j buys 
sub-bundle b, and 0 otherwise. Now the optimal bundling pricing problem can be 
formulated as the following IP problem: (M consistent) 
IP problem:                         
{ : } 1
max ( )
b
M
b b b
j j
p b B j b B
x p c β
∈ = ∈
−∑ ∑  
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Constraints: 
(No arbitrage)       1 2 ,b b b3p p p+ ≥ where 1 2 3, , ,b b b B∈ 1 2 ,b b = Φ∩ and  1 2b b b=∪ 3
(If no arbitrage condition is hold given 1 2 ,b b = Φ∩ it is easy to show it will be still 
hold under .) 1 2b b ≠ Φ∩
(Unit demand)        where{0,1},bjx ∈ ,j M b B∈ ∈  
(Buys at most one bundle)          1,bj
b B
X
∈
≤∑ where j M∈  
(IR)         if , otherwise0bjx = ( ) ^ ^ ^max{0, max{( ) | }}b b b bj jv p v p b B− < − ∈ 1bjx =  
where  ,j M b B∈ ∈
(non-negative price)   , where0bp ≥ b B∈  
Solving this IP problem gives the seller the optimal prices for every possible sub-
bundle. The main difficulty with this approach is its computational complexity. Notice 
that there are M times (2N-1) IR constraints, the number of which explodes when either 
the number of buyer types M or the number of products N increases. Hanson and Martin 
(1990) consider the case where a buyer’s payment depends only on how many products, 
not what products, she buys. Therefore the seller can only have at most N different 
bundle prices. They further assume that the number of buyer types M is much smaller 
than N. Finally, Hanson and Martin only solve the problem when N is less or equal to 21. 
When N continually increases, it is time-consuming to get the result with IP approach.  
The customized bundling method is proposed to simplify the IP approach. 
Customized bundling is a bundling strategy which gives consumers the right to choose 
any bundle of products of size q (q running from 1 through N) from a large pool of N 
 10
different goods, the price of which will depend only on the size of the bundle. Such an 
approach will be reasonable in the case of information goods where the marginal cost of 
providing each of the differentiated goods is roughly similar. The advantage of a 
customized bundling strategy is that it can increase profit for seller without the need to 
offer too many sub-bundles. In fact a seller only needs to consider N potential bundles 
instead of offering all (2N-1) sub-bundles. Furthermore, Hitt and Chen (2005) prove that, 
in some situations, the full bundling problem can be reduced to a customized bundle 
problem, and even if the problem cannot be reduced to a customized bundle problem, the 
profit the seller can get by using customized bundling will be closed to that which could 
be extracted under a full bundling strategy. This greatly simplifies the complexity of the 
problem. 
 
Restricting the Choice of Bundles 
To overcome the computational intractability, the customized bundling method is not 
good enough when N is large. In fact, when N is very large, it is still as time-demanding 
to get to the computational results when the customized bundling method is considered. 
Further restriction on the choice of bundles is proposed here to overcome the 
computational intractability when N is large. For this method, a seller only offers some 
sub-bundles, and not all N bundles; consumers only choose to buy from these offered 
bundles. This method can significantly help overcome the computational intractability 
problem since fewer sub-bundles are now being offered. The two-part tariff procedure 
proposed by Armstrong (1999) is one such procedure. 
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The Armstrong Two-Part Tariff Procedure 
 Armstrong (1999) suggests a two-part tariff procedure to avoid intractable computation, 
which can be considered as a method of dealing with the large number of products’ case. 
Specifically speaking, two-part tariff is that a buyer can choose any product she 
wants; if a buyer decides to buy at least one product, the seller charges her a fixed fee, p, 
plus the sum of marginal costs of all products this buyer purchases. For example, if a 
buyer buys products 1, 4, and 5, the price she pays is 1 4 5p c c c+ + + . Where is cost of 
product . Therefore this two-part tariff is a specific pricing schedule for mixed bundling. 
ic
i
Given such a pricing plan and if a buyer decides to pay p, she will buy product i if 
and only if . Where is the reserve price for product i. For convenience 
define . Then, a buyer will pay the fixed fee p if and only if . 
Denote , where N refers to the number of products. Let the mean and variance 
of be 
iv c> i
i
v
iv
^
max{ ,0}i iv v c= −
^
1
N
i
i
v p
=
≥∑
^
1
N
i
i
Y
=
= ∑
Y Yμ and 2Yσ , respectively. Note that Yμ is the upper bound of the profit the seller 
can get (i.e. profit under first-degree price discrimination. Under first-degree price 
discrimination, seller can extracts all consumers’ surplus, and the maximum of profit the 
seller can get from each consumer is Yμ = ( )E Y on average. Because the seller cannot 
clearly observe each consumer’s exact reserve price, instead of that, the seller only knows 
the distribution of the con sumers’ reserve price, so the profit the seller can extract isπ , 
which satisfiesπ Yμ< ). If the seller sets ( )1 Yp ε μ= − , then he can get a profit of  
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22
(1 ) Pr ( (1 ) )
(1 ) Pr (| | )
(1 ) [1 ( / ) ]
1 ( / )
Y Y
Y Y
Y Y Y
Y Y Y
ob Y
ob Y Y
ε μ ε
ε μ μ μ
ε μ σ εμ
ε σ εμ μ
Π = − • > −
≥ − • − >
≥ − • −
⎡ ⎤≥ − −⎣ ⎦
μ
)
 
Set ( 23/Y Yε σ μ= , the above inequality becomes 
                                 ( )231 / 1 2 /Y Yμ σ μ≥ Π ≥ − Y                                                        (1) 
Therefore, the seller’s profit from this two-part tariff bundling can come close to 
Yμ if /Y Yσ μ is small enough. For any given number of products, N, the seller can 
calculate /Y Yσ μ to determine the effectiveness of this bundling approach (in fact there is 
a potential assumption: the taste parameter should be independent distribute across 
different products). This bundling approach is especially promising when the number of 
products is very large.  
iv
When < , let  and , where N ∞
^
min{ | }E iivμ−
⎛ ⎞= ∈⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
N
2 ^
max{ ( ) | }iVar v i Nσ
− = ∈
σ− >0. Then, ( ) and from equation (1): 22 2 2 2/ /( ) ( /Y Y N Nσ μ σ μ σ μ− −⎛ ⎞≤ =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ) / N
                                 
2 1
31 / 1 2( / ) /Y Nμ σ μ
−
−
≥ Π ≥ − 3                                                     (2) 
When N→∞ , equation (2) implies YμΠ→ . In other words, when the number of 
products is very large, this simple two-part tariff enables the seller to get approximately 
the first-degree price discrimination profit. 
  This two-part tariff procedure, nevertheless, has one shortcoming: seller’s profit 
converges to the first price discrimination profit level at a rate of 3
1
N which is very slow. 
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The proportion of first-best profits obtainable using Armstrong’s procedure is as reported 
in Armstrong (1999): 
Table 1: The Percentage Profit Extraction under Varying N 
         N = 10         N = 100        N = 1000     N = 10,000 
        40%            72%          87%          94% 
 
  These results suggest that, in general, it is better to apply the two-part tariff strategy 
only when the number of products for sale is very large. An example of such instances is 
the case of Yahoo! Music that has in excess of one million songs on its server. When the 
number of products is small there is a significant discrepancy between the profits under 
the two-part tariff procedure and under first-price discrimination. 
A special case of the two-part tariff procedure is when all products have zero 
marginal costs [See Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999, 2000a, 2000b), Geng et al. (2005)]. 
This would be a reasonable assertion when, for instance, information goods such as 
online news are considered where the cost of duplicating or accessing information is 
virtually zero. In this special case, the simple mixed-bundling pricing degenerates to an 
even simpler pure bundling pricing, and the two-part tariff degenerates to a single fixed 
fee, p, which can be viewed as the bundle price for the bundle of all products. 
  Specifically, Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999a) consider a single seller providing N 
information goods to a set of consumersΩ . Each consumer demands either 0 or 1 units of 
each information good, and resale of these goods is not permitted (or is prohibitively 
costly for consumers). Valuations for each good are heterogeneous among consumers, 
and for each consumerω∈Ω , they use ( )Niv ω to denote the valuation of good i when a 
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total of N goods are purchased. It is allowed that ( )Niv ω  depends on N so that the 
distributions of valuations for individual goods can change as the number of goods 
purchased change. The practical example is that: these goods are complementary or 
substitutive, when a consumer buys different quantity goods, the reserve price for a 
specific item will change, for complementarity, the reserve price for a specific item will 
increase with the increasing of the purchasing of other goods; and for substitute, the case 
is reverse.  
  Let 
1
1 N
N
k
Nkx vN =
= ∑ be the mean (per-good) valuation of the bundle of N information 
goods. Let *Np ,
*
Nq  and 
*
Nπ  denote the profit-maximizing price per good for a bundle of N 
goods, the corresponding sales as a fraction of the population, and the seller’s resulting 
profits per good. Assuming the following conditions hold: 
“A1:  The marginal cost for copies of all information goods is zero to the seller. 
A2: For all N , consumer’s valuation is independent and uniformly bounded, 
with continuous density functions, non-negative support, mean 
Niv
Niμ and 
variance 2Niσ . 
A3:  Consumers have free disposal. In particular, for all  N > 1, 
.” 
1
( 1)
1 1
N N
Nk N k
k k
v v
−
−
= =
>∑ ∑
Under these conditions, it can be shown that selling a bundle of all N information 
goods can be remarkably superior to selling the N goods respectively. For the distribution 
of valuations underlying most common demand functions, bundling substantially reduces 
the average deadweight loss and leads to higher average profits for the seller. As N 
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increases, the seller captures an increasing fraction of the total area under the demand 
curve, correspondingly reducing both the deadweight loss and consumers’ surplus 
relative to selling the goods separately.  
Since the demand curve is derived from the cumulative distribution function for 
consumer valuations, it becomes more elastic near the mean, and less elastic away from 
the mean. Figure 1 which is reproduced from Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) illustrates 
this for the case of linear demand for the individual goods, showing, for instance, that 
combining two goods each with a linear demand produces a bundle with an s-shaped 
demand curve. As a result, the demand function (adjusted for the number of goods in the 
bundle) becomes more “square” as the number of goods increases. The seller is able to 
extract as profits an increasing fraction of the total area under this demand curve, while 
selling to an increasing fraction of consumers. 
Though Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) started this strand of research, their analysis 
is significantly flawed, as pointed out by Geng et al. (2005). Gent et al. 2005 consider 
bundling of information goods with decreasing values, such as when buyers consume 
products sequentially along the timeline and when a discount factor exists. 
Geng et al. point out that, when the number of products, N, goes to infinity, it is 
conceivable that /Y Nμ converges to zero—otherwise the bundle will be infinitely 
valuable and pricey, which is never the case in reality. In this case all average 
measures converge to zero and thus are not useful in deriving pricing suggestions. 
Instead, Geng et al. argues that the correct measures are the ones on the complete 
bundle, such as P and  in the discussion above.  Π
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Figure 1: Quantity for Bundle as a Fraction of Total Population 
 
 
  
The chapter reviews the literature on bundling as a tool for competition and a 
tool for price discrimination, especially on the bundling strategies for a large number 
of items. Of course there are other reasons for a seller to engage in bundling but these 
are of peripheral interest to the present work and thus not reviewed here. To 
understand how the bundling strategy is applied in reality, the next chapter describes 
a basic model which is an application of bundling strategy in e-journals. 
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Chapter 3 
The Chuang–Sirbu (CS) Model and An Extension 
Academic journals have traditionally been sold in the form of hard copies and by way of 
subscriptions. Individual articles are bundled into journal issues; issues are bundled into 
subscriptions. This aggregation approach has worked well in the paper-based 
environment because there exists strong economies of scale in the production, 
distribution and transaction of journals. However, with the global expansion and rapid 
commercialization of the Internet, the economics of journal publishing has been rapidly 
transformed. Many publishers are experimenting with various forms of on-line access to 
their journals. It is now technically feasible for the publisher to electronically deliver, and 
charge for, individual journal articles requested by a customer. The deployment of 
micropayment services, in particular, will dramatically lower the cost of purchasing 
digital information goods over the Internet. From the scholars’ perspective, this form of 
access is instantaneous, on-demand, and can avoid the cost associated with traditional 
library access, such as travel to the library, physical duplication of the article, and 
congestion due to shared use of journals. But in order to make network-delivery of 
journal articles become a reality, economic incentives must exist for publishers to 
unbundle their journals, or offer some sub-bundles whose size are not necessarily equal to 
the total number of articles. 
3.1 The Basic Model 
In Chuang and Sirbu (1999), or CS for short, they consider an N-good bundling model 
with multi-dimensional consumer preferences in order to study the key factors that 
determine the optimal bundling strategy. In this paper the N-dimensional goods are 
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academic journals.  
  By developing an N-goods bundling model with multi-dimensional consumer 
preferences, CS seek to demonstrate the existence of such incentive, and quantify how 
this incentive to unbundle is affected by readers’ journal-reading behavior. They employ 
two variables, and k, to describe the N-dimensional consumer preference. They allow 
each journal reader to rank all the N articles in the journal in such a decreasing order of 
preference as his/her favorite article is ranked first, the least favorite is ranked last. And 
weak monotonicity is observed. The reader may place zero value on any number of the N 
articles. By assuming a linear demand function for all positive-valued articles, they plot 
an individual reader’s valuation of all the articles in the journal axis. The individual’s 
most highly valued article has n = 0, and so its intercept, on y-axis, represents the 
willingness-to-pay for his/her favorite article. The valuation for the subsequently ranked 
articles is assumed to fall off at a constant rate until it reaches zero at  = kN. No articles 
have negative value on the assumption of free disposal—readers are free to discard 
unwanted articles at zero cost. The variable k dictates the slope of the demand curve, and 
it also indicates the fraction of articles in the journal that has non-zero value to the 
individual. If an individual’s k is greater than unity, that means he/she places positive 
value on all N articles in the journal. 
0w
0w
n
Formally, an individual’s valuation for the nth article can be expressed as: 
                        0( ) max 0, [1 ( )]
nw n w
kN
⎧ ⎫= −⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭  ,  0 n N 1≤ ≤ −                                    (3) 
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Figure 2: The Ranked Valuations 
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  Assuming that follows the uniform distribution in the unit interval [0, 1] and k 
follows the exponential distribution, then the survey conducted by Griffiths in 1995 is 
used to fit the critical variable in exponential distribution. Until now, CS have used two 
specific variables to control the heterogeneity of consumers. The last step is to get the 
optimal profit under pure bundling, pure unbundling and mixed bundling strategies 
respectively with numeric method (here, pure bundling means all articles be sold in a 
journal; pure unbundling means all articles are sold individually; mixed bundling means 
both journal and individual article are sold at the same time). Then the conclusion is that 
mixed bundling is superior to pure bundling and pure unbundling. 
0w
3.2 An Extension of the CS Model 
In CS (1999), they only resolve the optimal problem for the two-bundle situation. 
However, an important question that is often difficult to answer is: how does the 
maximized profit change if the seller of the articles can offer more bundles? In this thesis, 
the situation of the seller employing a three-bundle strategy is considered, that is, in 
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addition to individualized selling (the first kind of bundle) and selling the entire journal 
(the second kind of bundle), the seller offers an intermediate bundle of size n (the third 
kind of bundle), where n is an integer that lies between 1 and N (Note that N refers to the 
total number of articles).  
When employing this proposed strategy, several considerations are relevant. To 
maximize profits, the optimal intermediate bundle size n* and the price structure [the 
price for a single article P1, the price for the intermediate bundle (n*articles) Pn*, and the 
price for the entire journal PN] need to be known. Additionally, when the seller offers 
three bundles, the question as to how profits will compare with that under he CS 
procedure and with the situation under first price discrimination profit becomes relevant  
and whether there is an efficient and simple way to find the optimal n* also have to be 
considered.  
3.3 Description of the Proposed Method 
It is impossible to find the optimal n* and price structure analytically. Consequently, this 
thesis resorts to simulation for solutions. This simulation exercise involves the following: 
(a) Choice of marginal cost for each article: the empirical marginal cost is between $0.05 
and $0.5, so the marginal cost I choose is 0.3—nearly the mean of the empirical cost. 
(b) Random selection of highest reserve price, w0i (w0i is the i-th consumer’s highest 
reserve price): selecting w0i independently, with a uniform distribution [0.3, 1.3]. Thus 
for each i = 1, 2, … , M,  
                          0
0
( ) 1, [0.3,1.3]
( ) 0, [0.3,1.3]
i
i
f w m m
f w m m
= = ∈
= = ∉                                          (4) 
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Where f (∏) is a density function of w0i. The reason for the choice of 0.3 as the 
bottom value for the reserve price is that the seller always takes account of those 
consumers whose highest reserve price is higher than the marginal cost of the article. 
Because it is unprofitable for a seller to sell his articles to a consumer with a price less 
than 0.3 no matter in individual selling or bundling selling, They would never set a price 
for any individual article lower than 0.3, no matter in individual selling or in bundle 
selling. It means no articles will be sold to a consumer whose highest reserve price is less 
than 0. Therefore, it is redundant for the seller to consider such consumers whose highest 
reserve price is lower than 0.3. 
(c) Random selection of ki, but ki is not generated directly. Instead, ni is selected 
independently from a uniform distribution [0, N], where ni is the number of articles that 
the i-th consumer wants to buy, given the individual price equals to the marginal cost 
(given there is only individual selling), and N is the number of total articles in a journal. 
(See Figure 3 below)  
Figure 3: The Correlated Relationship Between ki and ni
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0( 0.
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N w
= −
i
i 3) . 
(d) Choice of N, the number of total articles in a journal: Let = 20, 21 ……, 39. The 
reason for these choices of N is that: in Hanson and Martin’s paper they only deal with 
the cases where the number of products N § 21, and the number of consumers is finite, M; 
while Armstrong’s way can work well only when the number of products is extremely 
large. So, there exists a gap between these two procedures. The proposed method is an 
attempt to fill this gap.  
N
(e) Choice of M, the number of consumers: For this exercise, the value of M is set at 
1000. 
The steps of the simulation procedure are summarized below: 
Step 1: Generating a set of heterogeneous consumers (generate w0i and ki). 
Step 2:  Set n*=1 and prices for all the three bundles equal to their marginal costs 
and, let consumers choose their favorite bundle, then calculate the profit 
the seller can get. 
Step 3:  Let n*=  n*+1 and increase the prices for all bundles gradually by a small 
increment, then calculate the profit the seller can get again. 
Step 4: Repeat step 3 until n* N= and at this time prices for all bundles are too 
high for consumers to buy (for instance, we only need to increase the 
individual price up to 1.3). Save all the results of the profits that can be got 
each time. 
Step 5:  Compare all the profits, and find out the optimal and optimal price 
structure. 
*n
 
For information, the MATLAB codes use to implement the procedure is included as 
Appendix 2. 
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Chapter 4 
The Main Results 
4.1 The Optimal Intermediate Bundle Size n* 
Although in the proposed procedure, the seller offers three bundles, what he only needs to 
do is to find out the optimal bundle size n* for his intermediate bundle. Since the other 
two bundles’ sizes are already given, namely, one bundle with individual article in it and 
one bundle with all the articles in it. According to our intuition, the optimal intermediate 
bundle size should be that: given the optimal number of articles that consumers want to 
buy follows a uniform distribution in the interval [0, ], and the other two bundles, 
individual article’s bundle and all articles’ bundle, the optimal intermediate bundle size 
should be n* =0.5N, where is the number of total articles. It seems that: the individual 
article’s bundle serves consumers whose n
N
N
i is small, where ni is defined as before; the 
intermediate bundle serves consumers whose ni is moderately large; and the all articles’ 
bundle serves consumers whose ni is very large.  However, with simulations, the result is 
different from our original intuition: 
 
Table 2: The Optimal Intermediate Bundle Size with varying N 
Total Number of Articles n* 
20 12 
25 15 
30 19 
35 22 
 
The optimal intermediate bundle size is nearly 0.6N (more numerical details are 
shown in Annex Table 1 of Appendix 1) and this can be easily discerned in Figure 4 
below. 
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 Figure 4: The Optimal Intermediate Bundle Size (n*) 
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In figure 4, the x-axis label is N, the total number of articles in a journal and the label 
for the y-axis is n*, the optimal bundle size for different values of N. Line 1 is the true 
optimal bundle size n* obtained from simulations. And line 2 is the approximate 
calculation of n* by using the formula n*= 0.6N. Two points may be discerned in the 
results. First, the true optimal bundle size fluctuates around 0.6N. Second, the amplitude 
of the fluctuations tapers off as the value of N increases. This suggests that setting the 
intermediate bundle size equal to 0.6N may be a reasonable practical approximation to 
the optimal bundle size n*, that is:  
           (4) * 0.6n ≈ N
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4.2 Comparison with the CS Procedure 
With repeated simulation, in which different consumers are generated each time, the rate 
of profit is 4% to 5% higher than that under CS procedure. This result is not surprising 
and is illustrated in figure 5 below:  
Figure 5: Rate of Profit under the Proposed Procedure and under the CS Procedure 
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In Figure 5, the y-axis indicates the rate of profit while the x-axis indicates the 
number of articles. Line 1 is the profit level under the proposed procedure, and line 2 is 
the profit under the CS procedure. It can be noticed that when the number of articles 
varies, the profit under my way will be always higher than that under the CS way.  
Profit1 is used to denote the profit under the proposed procedure, and Profit2 the 
profit under the CS procedure. 
 ( 1 2) / 2 4% 5%profit profit profit− ≈ − . 
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The reason is direct: In the proposed procedure the seller offers three bundles, and 
the profit is not less than that under the CS procedure, since if offering the intermediate 
bundle is not profitable, the seller would set the price for the intermediate bundle 
extremely high so that no one would buy it, that would make the situation the same with 
that under the CS procedure. 
4.3 Comparison with the Armstrong Procedure 
The two-part tariff procedure as proposed by Armstrong does not work well when the 
number of products is not too large. Specifically, when the number of products is small, 
there is a large gap between the profit under the two-part tariff procedure and the first 
price discrimination profit. Through simulations, it is found that the proportion of the 
profit divided by first price discrimination profit under the proposed procedure is higher 
than that under Armstrong’s procedure in this “not too large” number case. The details 
provided in Annex Table 2 of Appendix 1verify this point. However, there is a decreasing 
trend in the rate of profit extraction as may be seen from Figure 6 below. Note that in 
Figure 6, the x-axis gives the total number of articles in a journal (from 20 to 39); y-axis 
is the proportion of the profit under three bundles’ strategy divided by first price 
discrimination profit.  
The declining trend indicates the inadequacy of using only three bundles when there 
are more articles in a journal, a fact that should be intuitive. In other words, if there are 
more goods, in order to extract the same or a higher rate of the consumers’ surplus, the 
seller will need to offer more bundles. On the contrary, there is an increasing trend in the 
rate of extraction under the Armstrong procedure. Therefore, it can be expected that when 
the number of goods steadily increases, Armstrong’s procedure will be the natural choice. 
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Figure 6: The Rate of Profit Extraction under the Proposed Procedure  
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4.4 The Price Structure under the Three-Bundle Strategy 
With each simulation, the price structure under the three-bundle strategy has also been 
calculated. Information on the price structure is detailed in Annex Table 3 of Appendix 1. 
The average individual price in the bundle with all articles, which is denoted by ; 
and the average individual price in the bundle with articles, which is denoted by , 
can be calculated. Regardless of the value of N, the total number of articles, the following 
relationship holds: 
__
Np
*n
__
*np
__ __
* 1N np p< < p  
It means there is no arbitrage. Simply out, it will not be profitable for anyone to 
reconstruct the bundles that are offered by purchasing the individualized products. And 
this relationship is compatible with the reality. 
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 4.5 A Robustness Test 
There is a need to emphasize that the optimal bundle size that is obtained for each value 
of N is derived from one simulation only. This raise the question as to the robustness of 
the results elucidated above. Put different, if the simulation is repeated many times, will 
the result be different? Since testing all of the results is time-consuming and impractical, 
a compromise approach is to perform tests for specific values of N. Here N= 20 and N = 
30 were selected. The results which are reported in Annex Table 4 of Appendix 1 suggest 
that robustness is not likely to be an issue. 
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Chapter 5 
Directions for Further Research 
First of all, in the thesis, only the case of a seller offering three bundles in a journal 
market is considered. However, the optimal way to apply customized bundling to the 
journal market is to offer bundles, where is the number of total articles. However, it 
is impractical to find the optimal price structure for all the N bundles when N is large. 
Alternatively, the problem can be approached by focusing on the question of how profit 
changes when the number of bundles is increased. If the profit rises slowly even if the 
number of bundles continues to increase, when the number of bundles offered in the 
market reaches some N
N N
* (N*< ), the seller only needs to offer NN * bundles instead of N 
bundles. 
Secondly, in the basic model of this paper, the articles in the journal are assumed to 
be independent. Specifically, in the model, when a consumer buys a different article, his 
valuation of a specific article would not change, since his valuation of a specific article 
would only be decided by his own highest reserve price w0i, the decrease rate ki and his 
rank of the specific article. If the articles are considered as complements or substitutes 
(that means when a consumer buys a different article, his valuation of a specific article 
will change). For instance, when a consumer reads an article that is related to a specific 
article, it will be help him to have a better understanding of the specific article. Thus, his 
valuation of the specific article will change when he buys another related article. In this 
case, the articles are complimentary. This will have impact on results of the proposed 
model. This is a potential area for further research. 
Thirdly, in this thesis, the seller of a journal is treated as a monopolist in the journal 
market. The customized bundle is then used as a tool for price discrimination for the 
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seller. It is reasonable that in the market for journals two different journals will not 
contain articles that are exactly the same. Thus, two articles from different journals have 
nothing to do with each other due to the difference between journals. However, this case 
may not be applied to other Internet goods, such as mp3 music, since theses kinds of 
Internet goods’ sellers cannot be treated as monopolists. Mp3 music is taken as an 
example here. Different websites may have the same Mp3 music most of the time, which 
means that the music seller has to compete with other music sellers in the mp3 music 
market. Therefore both the bundling strategy and the price structure should be different 
from those in the situation of a monopoly market. It is interesting and important to study 
how the bundle strategy and the price structure can change in a duopoly market compared 
to those in a monopoly market. 
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Appendix 1 
Tables 
Annex Table 1: The Intermediate Bundle Size *( )n +
Scenario Total Number of Articles *n  
1 20 12 
2 21 14 
3 22 13 
4 23 14 
5 24 15 
6 25 15 
7 26 16 
8 27 17 
9 28 17 
10 29 18 
11 30 19 
12 31 19 
13 32 20 
14 33 20 
15 34 21 
16 35 22 
17 36 22 
18 37 23 
19 38 23 
20 39 24 
1
                                                 
+ The second column is the number of total articles in a journal, and the third column is the optimal bundle size under 
different number of articles. We can see that: the optimal bundle size will always be larger than the median value of N 
(N is the number of articles in a journal). 
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Annex Table 2: Rate of Profit Extraction under the Proposed Procedure with under the 
                     Armstrong Procedure 
 
The Number of Articles (N) Proposed Procedure Armstrong’s Procedure 
20 69.22% 52.48% 
21 68.79% 53.24% 
22 68.65% 53.96% 
23 68.44% 54.64% 
24 68.22% 55.28% 
25 68.24% 55.88% 
26 68.24% 56.46% 
27 68.24% 57% 
28 68.15% 57.52% 
29 68.04% 58.01% 
31 67.59% 58.94% 
32 67.75% 59.37% 
33 67.51% 59.78% 
34 67.60% 60.18% 
35 67.53% 60.56% 
36 67.57% 60.93% 
37 67.70% 61.29% 
38 67.70% 61.63% 
39 67.53% 61.96% 
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Annex Table 3: The Price Structure under the Proposed Procedure+
 
Total Intermediate Bundle Profit Level
Np *np  1p
20  12 1037.5 9.6 6.84 0.66 
21 14 1091.6 10.8 7.7 0.67 
22 13 1151.2 10.56 7.54 0.66 
23 14 1207.8 11.04 7.98 0.67 
24 15 1262.5 11.52 8.55 0.68 
25 15 1321 12.25 8.7 0.68 
26 16 1379.8 13 9.28 0.69 
27 17 1435.5 12.96 9.52 0.66 
28 17 1494.1 14 9.86 0.67 
29 18 1550.3 14.5 10.44 0.68 
30 19 1605.9 15 11.02 0.71 
31 19 1663 15.5 11.02 0.69 
32 20 1725.4 16 11.6 0.69 
33 20 1778 16.5 11.6 0.67 
34 21 1840.4 17 12.18 0.69 
35 22 1897.2 17.5 12.76 0.69 
36 22 1955.4 18 12.76 0.67 
37 23 2016.5 18.5 13.34 0.68 
38 23 2073.4 19 13.57 6.9 
39 24 2131 19.5 14.16 0.7 
2
                                                 
+
Np is the price for the journal (all articles’ bundle); *np is the price for the intermediate bundle articles; and 
*n
1p is the individual price.  
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Annex table 4: Optimal Bundle Size under Different Volume of N + (Robustness Test with 
Varying N) 
N=20, M=1000  
Trial Number Optimal Bundle Size (n*)
1 12
2 12
3 13 
4 12
5 13 
6 12
7 12 
8 12
9 11 
10 12
 
N=30, M=1000 
Trial Number Optimal Bundle Size (n*)
1 18
2 19
3 20 
4 19
5 19 
6 21
7 19 
8 20
9 19 
10 19
 
+
                                                 
+ N is the total number of articles 
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Appendix 2 
MATLAB Codes for the Simulation Program 
 
% generate the heterogeneous consumers;$ 
q=1000;   % the number of consumers 
c1=0.3;   % marginal cost 
N=20;    % N is the total number of articles, which can be changed in each case 
rand('state',sum(100*clock));         % control the state, each time we can pick different 
random                    sample from a specific distribution 
w=rand(q,1)+c1;                            % generate w0i 
intersect=N*rand(q,1); 
for i=1:q; 
    k(i)=intersect(i)/N*w(i)/(w(i)-c1);    
end; 
c=zeros(q,2); 
for i=1:q; 
c(i,:)=[w(i),k(i)]; 
end; 
maxprofit=0; 
 step 2 
a1=zeros(N,1); 
for j0=1:101; 
       pN=N*c1+(j0-1)/100*N; 
tic 
 for n=1:N; 
 profit1=zeros(101,101); 
   for j1=1:101; 
       p1=c1+(j1-1)/100; 
       for j2=1:101; 
         pn=n*c1+(j2-1)/100*n; 
    for i=1:q; 
    n1=(1-p1/c(i,1))*N*c(i,2); 
    if n1>0; 
        n1=n1; 
    else n1=0; 
    end; 
    n1=fix(n1);      %if a consumer choose to buy individual article, this is the number of 
articles he will buy; 
     p=pn/n;          % average price of article in the bundle; 
  n2=(1-p/c(i,1))*c(i,2)*N; 
  if n2<0; 
      n2=0; 
  else if n2>=0; 
          n2=fix(n2);        %n2 is the number of article that consumers want to buy by bundle 
buying; 
      end; 
   end; 
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a=fix(n2/n);        % if a consumer chooses to buy intermediate bundle, this is the number of 
intermediate bundles he will buy; 
   if a*n<=N 
       a=a; 
   else if a*n>N; 
           a=fix(N/n);       %gurantee a*n<=N; 
       end; 
   end; 
   %calculate that after a consumer buys several bundles, how many individual articles the 
consumer will buy; 
     if n1-a*n>=0&n1<N; 
       n4=n1-a*n; 
     else if n1>N; 
             n4=N-a*n; 
   else if n1-a*n<0; 
           n4=0;       
       end; 
   end;                    
     end; 
      
n2=a*n+n4;              %the number of articles being bought under intermediate bundle buying; 
   
    n3=(a+1)*n; 
    n5=c(i,2)*N;              % w(1-n5/k/N)=0; 
    % 1 category: buying individual article; 
    if n1<=N; 
        n1=n1; 
        else if n1>N; 
            n1=N; 
        end; 
    end; 
    b1=c(i,1)*(n1-n1*(n1+1)/2/c(i,2)/N)-n1*p1; 
    % 2 category: buying intermediate bundles with individual article; 
    b2=c(i,1)*(n2-n2*(n2+1)/2/c(i,2)/N)-a*pn-n4*p1; % consumer surplus by buying 
intermediate bundles and the additional individual articles; 
    % 3 category: buying intermediate bundles without individual article; 
    if n3<=N&n5>n3; 
        b3=c(i,1)*(n3-n3*(n3+1)/2/c(i,2)/N)-(a+1)*pn; 
    elseif n3<=N&n5<=n3; 
            b3=c(i,1)*(n5-n5*(n5+1)/2/c(i,2)/N)-(a+1)*pn; 
    elseif n3>N&n5>=N; 
            b3=c(i,1)*(N-N*(N+1)/2/c(i,2)/N)-(a+1)*pn; 
    elseif n3>N&n5<N; 
                b3=c(i,1)*(n5-n5*(n5+1)/2/c(i,2)/N)-(a+1)*pn; 
        end; 
    %4 category: buying all articles as a whole bundle; 
    if n5>=N; 
        b4=c(i,1)*(N-N*(N+1)/2/c(i,2)/N)-pN; 
    elseif n5<N; 
        b4=c(i,1)*(n5-n5*(n5+1)/2/c(i,2)/N)-pN; 
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    end; 
 if b1>=b2&b1>=b3&b1>=b4; 
     profit1(j1,j2)=profit1(j1,j2)+n1*p1-n1*c1; 
 elseif b2>b1&b2>=b3&b2>=b4; 
         profit1(j1,j2)=profit1(j1,j2)+a*pn+n4*p1-n2*c1; 
 elseif b3>b1&b3>b2&b3>=b4; 
             profit1(j1,j2)=profit1(j1,j2)+(a+1)*pn-(a+1)*n*c1; 
         elseif b4>b1&b4>b2&b4>b3; 
             profit1(j1,j2)=profit1(j1,j2)+pN-N*c1; 
             else profit1(j1,j2)=profit1(j1,j2); 
         end;     
     end; 
 end; 
    end; 
       
        optimal(j0,n)=max(max(profit1)); 
end; 
 toc 
   sprintf('j0=%d',j0) 
end; 
% for different bundle size, find the maximum profit; 
maxprofit=max(max(optimal)); 
 % find the optimal intermediate bundle size n*; 
a2=find(optimal==maxprofit); 
a2=fix(a2/101)+1;                               % a2 is the optimal n* 
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